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ARTHUR A. JONES, Appellant, v. LOUISE B. :MARTIN 
et al., Defendants; ISABELLE WELLINS, as Admin-
istratrix etc. et al., Respondents. 
[1] Attorneys-Compensation-Contracts for Contingent Fees-
Effect of Discharge.-An attorney employed under a contin-
gent fee agreement who is wrongfully discharged by his client 
is generally entitled to the same amount of compensation and 
under the same contingency as if he had completed the ser-
vices contemplated. 
[2] !d.-Compensation-Contracts for Contingent Fees-Equitable 
Interest.-A contingent fee agreement vests the attorney with,... 
an equitable interest in that part of the client's cause of action 
which is agreed on as the contingent fee. 
[3] Id.-Compensation-Lien.--An attorney under a contingent 
fee agreement has no special or charging lien, unless it has 
been specifically contracted for. 
[4] Assignments-Rights and Liabilities of Parties.-A debtor will 
not be discharged from his obligations by performance ren-
dered to the assignor after notice of assignment. 
[5a, 5b] Attorneys-Compensation-Lien-Waiver or EstoppeL-
An attorney who was retained under a contingent fee contract 
which operated as an assignment pro tanto to him of anything 
collected on the client's claim, and who was discharged without 
cause by client before settlement of claim, waived or was 
estopped to assert any lien or equitable interest he might have 
had to sums collected on settlement of claim, and the obliga-
tion secured by such lien was lost, where he stated in affidavits 
executed by him for purpose of attaching such funds that he 
had no lien, and where he orally agreed with the debtor's at-
torney that the latter would notify him when the debtor had 
paid any judgment or compromise of the action, and did not 
object, on receiving such notification, that the payment was 
made to his client or assignor instead of to him. 
[1] See Cal.Jur.2d, Attorneys at Law, § 197; Am.Jur., Attorneys 
at Law, § 163 et seq. 
[2] See Cal.Jur.2d, Attorneys at Law,§ 192; Am.Jur., Attorneys 
at Law, § 163 et seq. 
McK. Dig. References: [1] Attorneys, § 104; [2] Attorneys, 
§ 102; [3, 5] Attorneys, § 96; [ 4] Assignment, § 62; [ 6] Liens, § 19; 
[7] Appeal and Error, § 1521; [8] Decedents' Estates, § 481. 
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[6] Liens-Waiver or EstoppeL-Waiver of or estoppel to assert 
a lien or an equitable interest in property does not necessarily 
mean that the obligation secured by the lien or giving rise to 
the interest is lost, for it may exist without the security or 
other assurance that it will be discharged. 
[7] Appeal-Harmless Error- Pleading- Variance and Proof.-
Plaintiff's claim that estoppel or waiver was not properly 
pleaded because it was alleged in defendant's answer that the 
agreement in question was made when a substitution of at-
torneys was filed rather than some two years later, as found 
by the court, is not prejudicial to plaintiff where he was ad-
vised of the situation he had to meet and the seeming variances 
as to times was not vital. 
[8] Decedents' Estates-Claims-Presentation-Attorney's Fees.-
An attorney who was retained under a contingent fee contract 
which operated as an assignment pro tanto to him of anything 
collected on the client's claim, and who was discharged with-
out cause by client before settlement of claim, cannot maintain 
an action for such fees against administratrix of estate of at-
torney who succeeded him and who effectuated a settlement 
of such claim, where no claim for such fees was filed against 
that estate (Prob. Code, §§ 707, 709); and he cannot escape 
such claim requirement by asserting a constructive trust 
against the deceased attorney, where he has waived or is 
estopped from asserting any equitable interest in property of 
estate by failing to include decedent as a named party in his 
original complaint, by asserting that he was entitled to half 
the recovery under his contingent fee contract, and by at-
taching decedent's bank account, thereby indicating reliance 
on a contract debt rather than a claim to specific property as 
the beneficiary of a constructive trust. 
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los 
Angeles County. Allen W. Ashburn, Judge. Affirmed. 
Action to recover attorney's fees. Judgment for defendants 
affirmed. 
Arthur A. Jones, in pro. per., for Appellant. 
Belli, Ashe & Pinney, as Amici Curiae on behalf of Ap-
pellant. 
Macbeth & Ford, Vincent J. Blumberg, Patrick H. Ford and 
David Sokol for Respondents. 
[8] See Cal.Jur., Executors and Administrators,§§ 500, 505, 509; 
Am.Jur., ;Executors and Administrators, § 348 et seq. 
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GARTER, J.-Plaintiff appeals from a judgment for de-
fendants, except Mrs. Martin, in an action to recover at-
torney's fees. Defendants in the original complaint were 
Mrs. Martin, a labor union-an unincorporated association, 
and some of the members thereof. By amended complaint, 
\711 ellins, an attorney at law, was added as a defendant. Later 
he died and Isabelle W ellins, as the administratrix of his 
estate, was substituted. 
According to the findings (the case was tried by the court 
without a jury) plaintiff, an attorney at law, was employed 
by Mrs. Martin by written contract to represent her in prose-
cuting a claim against the union for personal injuries arising 
out of an assault and battery, under which contract he was to 
receive a contingent fee of 50 per cent of all sums recovered 
on the elaim by action, compromise or otherwise. It was also 
agreed that plaintiff was to have full charge of the collection 
of the claim; that a discharge of plaintiff would not affect his 
right or interest in the claim and a recovery thereon; that the 
agreement operates as an assignment and transfer pro tanto 
to plaintiff of the claim and right to recover and anything 
collected thereon. Plaintiff commenced an action on the 
claim but before it was tried, and on April1, 1949, defendant, 
Mrs. Martin, without just cause, discharged plaintiff as her 
attorney and had defendant Wellins substituted in his place. 
The action was tried by W ellins and judgment obtained on 
November 8, 1950, in favor of Mrs. Martin for $24,126.29. 
While that action was pending and before judgment, plaintiff 
commenced the instant action on September 25, 1950, in which 
vVellins was not a party defendant. The complaint was en-
titled one for money due, and alleged that a judgment had 
been obtained (apparently, however, it had not yet been 
entered at that time) ; that plaintiff was entitled to one-half 
the judgment under the contract; that the judgment debtors 
were willing to pay and are indebted to plaintiff and should 
be enjoined from paying to Mrs. Martin; and that plaintiff, 
by reason of his contract, had a lien on the judgment for one-
half thereof. The amended complaint filed in May, 1951, 
made Well ins a party and charged him with having received 
and paid out in part, the $20,000 which was received in 
settlement of the judgment, knowing of plaintiff's claim and 
lien, and that he held the $20,000 as constructive trustee for 
plaintiff. vVellins knew of the pendency of this action on or 
about November 15, 1950, and of plaintiff's contract at all 
times since April 8, 1949. The union also knew of the con-
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tract at all times since April 18, 1949, and there had been 
served upon them a written notice of lien on April 27, 1949. 
On August 16, 1950, plaintiff orally agreed with David Sokol, 
the union's attorney, that Sokol would notify plaintiff when 
the union had paid the judgment or a compromise of the action 
and plaintiff would then attempt to attach the money. The 
action was settled for $20,000 on April 16, 1951, by check to 
Mrs. Martin and Wellins. On April 17, 1951, Wellins de-
posited the check to his account and paid $4,000 to the union's 
workmen's compensation insurance carrier and $8,000 to him-
self as attorney's fees. On April 20, 1951, he paid the balance 
of $8,000 to Mrs. Martin and she left the state. Sokol tele-
phoned plaintiff's office on April16, 1951, to notify him of the 
settlement but was unable to contact him. He did notify him 
on April 17, 1951, at which time plaintiff made no protest or 
objection to the payment of the settlement amount, or claim 
that it violated his rights and did not assert any claim of lien. 
On September 25, 1950, plaintiff filed in the instant action 
an affidavit for attachment which stated that the union and 
Mrs. Martin were indebted to him for $12,063.15, on contract 
and the payment has not been secured by a lien or mortgage 
on personal property. The sheriff was instructed to levy on 
the judgment. On April 21, 1951, plaintiff again executed an 
affidavit for attachment, stating that defendants in the instant 
action were indebted to him on contract for $10,000 and that 
its payment is not secured by any lien upon personal property. 
The attachment was levied on \Vellins' bank account and was 
not discharged until W ellins' death on June 15, 1951. On 
April 23, 1951, Wellins told plaintiff of the disbursement 
of the settlement money as above described. W ellins died on 
June 15, 1951, and his administratrix was substituted in his 
place. 
Finally it was concluded that plaintiff had waived his claim 
for an attorney fee lien and defendants ceased to be con-
structive trustees of the fund upon the waiver; that plaintiff 
had filed no claim against the estate of Wellins pursuant to 
§ 707 of the Probate Code and hence his action was pre-
mature. 
It was also concluded that plaintiff have judgment for 
$8,000 against Mrs. Martin bjlt that plaintiff waived his at-
torney lien as to the other defendants and is estopped to assert 
any lien; that plaintiff take nothing as to those defendants. 
Judgment was accordingly entered. 
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l'laintiff nontrmr1s that evPn if he lost his "attorney's lien" 
he did not lose his cause of' action against the union or W ellins, 
such cause of action being based upon payment by the debtor, 
the union, to the assignor Mrs. Martin, after notice to the 
debtor of the pro tanto assignment by Mrs. Martin to plaintiff 
of whatever was recovered on her claim for damages against 
the union; that vV ellins, and later his administratrix, held 
the money received from the union as constructive trustee 
because he had received it with knowledge of plaintiff's claim 
under his attorney's fee contract; that there was no estoppel 
or waiver of either his lien, his cause of action, or right to 
assert a constructive trust; that because there was a con-
t>tructive trust it was not necessary to file a claim against 
W ellins' estate under section 707 of the Probate Code. 
There is no question that the union and W ellins were fully 
advised of plaintiff's contract with Mrs. Martin and any 
rights he had thereunder and the court so found. No ques-
tion is raised as to the validity of the ''assignment'' features of 
that contract or that a lien could have been thereby created. 
'l'he contract was not unconscionable and plaintiff was dis-
charged without cause. [1] An attorney employed under 
a contingent fee agreement who is wrongfully discharged by 
his client, is generally entitled to the same amount of com-
pensation and under the same contingency as if he had com-
pleted the services contemplated. (Salopek v. Schoemarnn, 
20 Cal.2d 150 [124 P.2d 21] ; Zur1:ch G. A. & L. Ins. Co., 
Ltd. v. Kinsler, 12 Cal.2d 98 [81 P.2d 913] ; Denio v. City 
of Huntington Beach, 22 Cal.2d 580 [140 P.2d 392, 149 A.L.R. 
320]; see cases eollected 6 Cal.Jur.2d, Attorneys at Law, 
§ 197.) [2] And "A contingent fee agreement vests the 
attorney with an equitable interest in that part of the client's 
cause of action which is agreed upon as the contingent fee. 
'l'his proposition may be given practical effeet by the imposi-
tion of a constructive trust for the protection of the attorney's 
equitable interest, by acknowledging the existence of an ex-
press trust created by the contingent fee agreement in favor of 
the attorney, or by ruling that neither the client nor the 
opposite party, if the latter has knowledge of the attorney's 
rights under the contingent fee agreement, can so compromise 
the litigated subject matter as to defeat the attorney's rights. 
. . . [3] However, an attorney under a contingent fee agree-
ment has no special or charging lien, unless it has been 
specifically contracted for." ( 6 Cal.Jur.2d, Attorneys at Law, 
§ 192.) [ 4] It is also true that a debtor will not be dis-
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charged from his obligations by performance rendered to the 
assignor after notice of the assignment. (McCarthy v. Mt. 
Tecarte L. & W. Co., 110 Cal. 687 [43 P. 391]; Greenlee v. 
Los Angeles Tntst etc. Bank, 171 Cal. 371 [153 P. 383] ; 
H. D. Roosen Co. v. Pac'ific Radio Pub. Co., 123 Cal.App. 525 
[11 P.2d 873]; Gmham Paper Co. v. Pembroke, 124 Cal. 117 
[56 P. 627, 71 Am.St.Rep. 26, 44 L.R.A. 632]; Nelson v. Fer-
nando Nelson & Sons, 5 Cal.2d 511 [55 P.2d 859], Rest. Con-
tracts, § 170.) 
It would appear, therefore, under the foregoing rules that 
neither the union nor vV ellins could pay the money recovered 
to Mrs. Martin and be relieved of the obligation under the 
assignment, or "equitable interest," "lien" or constructive 
trust unless plaintiff waived or was estopped to assert such 
rights, as was found by the court. 
[5a] In regard to the union it is clear that plaintiff 
waived or is estopped to assert any "lien" or "equitable in-
terest.'' \V e have the two attachment affidavits in which it 
was asserted under oath by plaintiff that he had no lien-
that the payment of his claim for attorney's fees was not 
secured by any ''lien.'' That may well be interpreted to in-
clude any equitable interest. There is also.the oral agreement 
of August 16, 1950, between Sokol, the union's attorney, and 
plaintiff, found by the. court, that "Sokol would notify said 
plaintiff ... when his clients, the said ... [Union] had 
paid any judgment or compromise of said action ... and that 
said plaintiff . . . would then try to attach the money by 
proceeding in this then pending action . . . '' from which it is 
implicit that plaintiff was not only not insisting on his right 
to a lien-equitable interest but was also waiving any objec-
tion he had to the payment to his assignor instead of to him. 
[6] The waiver of or estoppel to assert a lien or an equitable 
interest in property does not necessarily mean that the obliga-
tion secured by the lien or giving rise to the interest is lost, 
as it may exist without the security or other assurance that 
it will be discharged. [5b] But here the court was justified 
in concluding that not only the lien and equitable interest 
were lost, but also the obligation, because, implicit in the oral 
agreement is an authorization by plaintiff (assignee) that the 
union (debtor) could pay the assignor (Mrs. Martin) rather 
than him. Subsequent to the agreement, and on April 16, 
1951, Sokol paid to Mrs. .Martin and W ellins the $20,000 
settlement, after trying unsuccessfully, but without fault on 
his part, to notify plaintiff thereof. He notified him on April 
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17, 1951, and the court found that "At said time of said 
notice said plaintiff made no protest or objection to said pay-
ment, made no claim that it violated any of his rights, and 
made no assertion of any right to a lien on the fund before 
said payment.'' 
Plaintiff makes numerous claims with respect to the fore-
going, such as asserted negligence and fraud on Sokol's part, 
no justified reliance on the oral agreement, and further that 
his action (the instant one) commenced in September, 1950, 
after the oral agreement, charging the nnion with responsi-
bility, prevented reliance on the agreement by the union. The 
whole course of events and conduct of plaintiff subsequent to 
the commencement of his action, and thereafter, showed that 
he was not relying upon a claim against the union. These 
events, supported by adequate evidence, are summarized by 
the trial court in its memorandum opinion as follows: ''The 
minute order for judgment in the Schneiderman case [the 
personal injury action] was made on August 15, 1950. On 
the next day Mr. Sokol, attorney for the Union defendants, 
wrote plaintiff saying 'It is very urgent that you get in touch 
with me and I shall appreciate hearing from you.' (Exhibit B.) 
Mr. Sokol previously had been notified in writing of plaintiff's 
claim of an attorney's lien. Shortly after receipt of this 
letter plaintiff called at Mr. Sokol's home and was told that 
the latter was at a loss to know what his, plaintiff's, rights 
were against Sokol's clients, that he knew of no right to a lien 
against them and that he would like to know what plaintiff 
wanted him to do. Thereupon plaintiff said that all he would 
ask of Mr. Sokol was to notify him when the defendants had 
paid the judgment and that he would try to attach. This is 
all he asked Mr. Sokol to do. ·when the judgment was entered, 
Mr. Sokol promptly notified plaintiff of that fact. There-
upon an appeal was taken, followed ultimately by a com-
promise in April, 1951. The ... Union sent its $20,000 
check to Mr. Sokol who received it on April 16, 1951. He 
railed plaintiff that same day and before contacting Mr. 
W ellins concerning receipt of the check. Being unable to 
reach plaintiff, he told Mr. Alperin, his office associate, that 
if Mr. Jones should call, to tell him of the fact of the receipt 
of the money to close the settlement of the judgment. But 
lVIr. \V ellins was pressing him for a consummation of the com-
promise and so on that same day the $20,000 was paid to him 
by Mr. Sokol. On the 17th Sokol reached plaintiff by tele-
phone and plaintiff said that his secretary had not been in 
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the office on the 16th. He also said that he would attempt 
to attach or restrain the payment of the money by W ellins. 
Mr. Sokol heard no more from Mr. Jones until on the 25th 
of April. In the meantime the alias writ of attachment was 
issued on the 23d, based upon plaintiff's affidavit of the 21st. 
Although this writ was not levied on any property of the 
union defendants, Mr. Sokol was curious and on the 25th 
called on Mr. Jones, asking him why he was keeping his, 
Sokol's clients in the case, asserting that no attorney's lien 
could run against them,-a position he still maintains and in 
apparent good faith. Plaintiff said he did not know, but he 
thought he might have something. The significance of this 
conversation of the 25th,-after the money had been paid over 
to \V ellins,-is that it shows plaintiff had little confidence in 
his lien and was relying upon other remedies, such as injunc-
tion and attachment. J_jater, when Mr. Sokol reproached him 
for inserting in the amended complaint herein an allegation 
that he, Sokol, had promised to deposit the money in court, 
Mr. Jones replied that he had to put something in there. In 
fact, plaintiff never made any such request and Mr. Sokol 
made no such promise. He fully performed his promise to 
plaintiff both in letter and in spirit. It is apparent from 
the foregoing that the court accepts on all points of conflict 
the testimony of Mr. Sokol rather than that of Mr. Jones, 
whose credibility has been destroyed in divers ways and re-
spects. The charges of unethical conduct which were hurled 
at Mr. Sokol by Mr. Jones from the witness stand are untrue. 
"Plaintiff's conduct justifiably led Mr. Sokol to believe 
that he did not and would not stand upon his claim of a 
lien. The union defendants have changed their position to 
their prejudice in reliance upon plaintiff's conduct and he is 
estopped now to insist upon the lien against them. . . . '' 
Plaintiff's main argument on this point (waiver of lien) 
seems to center around the alleged incredibility of the union's 
witness Sokol. That was a question for the trial court which 
was resolved against plaintiff and it was justified in drawing 
reasonable inferences which established a waiver or estoppel 
rather than those to the contrary. 
It is urged that estoppel or waiver cannot apply because 
there was no misleading conduct or statements by plaintiff as 
to present facts-only future promises were made. As seen 
from the oral agreement and other conduct of plaintiff, there 
was a present intent to abandon the claim against the union. 
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[7] Plaintiff claims that the estoppel or waiver was not 
properly pleadAd because it was alleged in the union's answer 
that the agreement was made when the substitution of at-
torneys was filed rather than in August, 1951, as found by 
the court. It was alleged in the answer that at the time of 
the substitution plaintiff told Sokol there was nothing he could 
do ''until any money recovered by the plaintiff . . . was paid 
by these defendants and that plaintiff would appreciate it if 
David Sokol would advise plaintiff when the matter came to 
trial and when judgment was entered''; that thereafter at 
various times Sokol communicated with plaintiff, and after 
entry of the judgment in the personal injury action plaintiff 
again said that all he expected of Sokol was to advise plaintiff 
when payment was made, and there was nothing else Sokol 
could do, and plaintiff could do nothing as to the payment 
until payment had been made. The court found the oral 
agreement as above mentioned and that the allegations of the 
answer were true except that it is not true that plaintiff's 
request to Sokol to keep plaintiff posted was made at the time 
of substitution, or that plaintiff said Sokol could do nothing 
until payment, or that Sokol's discussion concerning what 
action plaintiff wanted from Sokol was shortly after the entry 
of the judgment or by telephone. But it is true that ''plaintiff 
in said discussion did state that all he wanted said Sokol to 
do in plaintiff's behalf was to advise plaintiff when payment 
had been made to defendant Louise Martin or her attorney, 
Marvin W ellins; and it is not true that plaintiff advised said 
Sokol that there was nothing else that said Sokol could do, 
but it is true that plaintiff did advise said Sokol, shortly after 
August 15, 1950, that there was nothing else said Sokol should 
do as far as plaintiff's rights were concerned; and it is not 
true that plaintiff at said time stated to said Sokol that under 
the law plaintiff could take no action whatsoever until said 
Sokol or the defendants he represented had paid over the 
moneys pursuant to the judgment to said Louise Martin.'' 
We do not believe that plaintiff was prejudiced. He was 
advised of the situation he had to meet and the seeming 
variances as to times was not vital. Indeed, plaintiff admitted 
the conversation in regard to the agreement: 
'' Q. BY MR. SoKoL: Didn't you tell me in my home when 
I asked you what I could do, that the only thing-you told me 
'Sokol, when you pay the money, let me know and then I 
will attach it.' Did you or did you not tell me that, in my 
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home~ A. That was part of the conversation, but not all of it. 
You are leaving out other parts that are very important." 
[8] In regard to W ellins it appears that recovery against 
his administratrix was properly denied because of plaintiff's 
failure to file a claim against the estate. Section 707 of the 
Probate Code provides that all claims arising upon contract 
must be filed or presented within the time required or they 
are barred. Likewise a claim must be presented or filed 
where, as here, an action against decedent involving the claim 
is pending at the time of his death and no recovery may be 
had unless there is proof of the filing or presentment of a 
claim. (Prob. Code, § 709.) Here plaintiff did not present or 
file any claim. 
He endeavors to escape the claim requirement by asserting 
that none is required where he is, as here, asserting a con-
structive trust against \:Vellins, decedent. (See llA Cal.Jur. 
706-707, 711-712.) The theory is that by reason of the trust 
the beneficiary has an interest in specific property included 
in the assets of the estate-a claim that such interest belongs 
to him, not to the estate, as distinguished from a debt or 
obligation arising out of contract. 
That argument will not aid plaintiff because he has waived 
or is estopped from asserting any equitable interest in any 
property of W ellins' estate by the following: In his original 
complaint he did not even include W ellins as a named party, 
and while he mentioned a lien he asserted that he was entitled 
to half the recovery under his contingent :fee contract, and 
that the whole is due and owing, and that defendants are in-
debted to plaintiff under said contract. In his amended com-
plaint filed on May 24, 1951, when he named W ellins as a 
defendant, he does allege that Wellins held the $20,000 pro-
ceeds of the settlement as constructive trustee, and he also 
alleged that W ellins was indebted to him in the sum of 
$10,000. In his first affidavit for attachment on the original 
complaint, he asserted that defendants (union and members) 
were indebted to him on a contract for the direct payment of 
money and it was not secured by any lien. The same state-
ments were made in his second affidavit for attachment which 
was filed on April 23, 1951, and an attachment was issued 
and levied. on W ellins' bank account and not released until 
after Wellins died on June 15, 1951. We think, from the 
foregoing, it is clear that plaintiff had lost any claim to an 
interest in any property of W ellins' estate, and when the 
latter died, plaintiff's only claim was for money arising from 
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contract, and hence required the presentment or filing of a 
claim. In Steiner v. Rowley, 35 Cal.2d 713 [221 P.2d 9], the 
complaint had counts on contract and tort involving the same 
transaction. Plaintiff attached and it was held that he was 
estopped to rely upon the action in tort. Similarly, here 
plaintiff attached the bank account of Wellins indicating 
reliance upon a contract debt rather than a claim to specific 
property as the beneficiary of a constructive trust. 
The judgment is affirmed. 
Shenk, J., Edmonds, J., Schauer, J., and Spence, J., 
concurred. 
Appellant's petition for a rehearing was denied June 4, 
1953. 
[L. A. No. 22537. In Bank. May 15, 1953.] 
NAOMI S. TALLEY et al., Appellants, v. NORTHERN SAN 
DIEGO COUNTY HOSPITAL DISTRICT (a Corpora-
tion), Respondent. 
[1] Pleading-Admissions.-For purpose of testing a question of 
law, all facts well pleaded are admitted. 
[2] Id.-Pacts Judicially Noticed.-Facts of which judicial notice 
may be taken will be considered by court, although not pleaded, 
for purpose of testing a question of law. 
[3] State of California-Actions Against.-When acting in its 
governmental capacity a sovereign may not be sued, except 
where the doctrine has been specifically departed from by con-
stitutional or statutory law. 
[4] Id.-Tort Liability.-Doctrine of sovereign nonliability for 
tort applies to state subdivisions only where they are acting in 
a governmental capacity in discharge of official duties. 
[5] Id.-Tort Liability.-Where the state engages in industrial or 
business enterprises, as distinguished from purely governmental 
activities, tort liability attaches and may be adjudicated pur-
suant to the consent statute. (Gov. Code, § 16041.) 
[3] See· Cal.Jur., State of California, § 37 et seq.; Am.Jur., 
States, Territories and Dependencies, § 91 et seq. 
McK. Dig. References: [1] Pleading, § 138; [2] Pleading, § 13; 
[3, 15] State of California, § 67; [ 4, 5] State of California, § 57; 
[6] Hospitals, §1; (7-10] Hospitals, §8; (11-14] Hospitals, §5.1. 
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